Could an Italian Bank Run Trigger a Euro Crisis? A CFA Perspective

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  • February 24, 2025
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Could an Italian Bank Run Trigger a Euro Crisis? A CFA Perspective

The Italian government’s defiance of the European Commission regarding its 2019 budget has intensified concerns about the Eurozone’s stability. Rising bond yields and mounting pressure on Italian banks are raising critical questions: Could a bank run in Italy precipitate a wider Euro crisis? This is a crucial issue for financial analysts and economists, particularly those holding the CFA charter, who are keenly focused on European market risks.

Historical precedents offer some context. In the aftermath of German reunification, interest rate hikes in the early 1990s destabilized the European Monetary System (EMS). Countries pegged to the Deutsche Mark struggled, leading to speculative attacks, devaluations, and ultimately, a significant currency decoupling. This turbulent period spurred European leaders to accelerate the creation of the Euro, aiming to shield member states from disruptive market forces.

However, the fundamental question remains: Is the Euro truly immune to such destructive market pressures today?

Economist Stefan Homburg, in a recent analysis, suggests the answer is no. He posits that a Eurozone nation could be forced out of the monetary union by a classic bank run.

Consider the current situation in Italy. Italian banks are showing signs of strain, and some depositors are already moving funds abroad. Imagine a scenario where widespread depositor panic erupts, triggering a massive capital flight to safer havens like Germany. German banks, facing increased liabilities from Italian depositors, would likely demand Italian banks settle these obligations in central bank money, rather than through interbank loans.

This deposit outflow would rapidly deplete the central bank reserves of Italian banks. As these reserves dwindle, Italian banks would need to secure more central bank money to continue facilitating transfers to Germany. One avenue is to exchange existing loan portfolios with the Italian central bank (Banca d’Italia – BdI) for reserves, potentially through repurchase agreements. As long as these loans are of acceptable quality, they could be used within the European Central Bank (ECB)’s standard refinancing operations. However, if Italian banks are left with primarily low-quality or “dubious” loans, they would have to turn to the BdI’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) mechanism.

In a purely theoretical model, Italian banks could shed all their deposits and loans. The loans would reside with the BdI, the deposits in Germany, and the BdI would accumulate liabilities within the Target2 interbank payment system, matched by corresponding claims for the Bundesbank. In this theoretical construct, a bank run alone wouldn’t shatter the Euro.

Yet, practical realities paint a different picture. Italian banks would face immense hurdles in acquiring sufficient central bank money to sustain a massive deposit exodus. The ECB Governing Council holds the power to curtail this process. A simple majority can halt the full allotment of central bank funds, and a two-thirds majority can block the BdI’s provision of ELA. A significant deposit flight from Italy would likely trigger alarm bells among many council members.

Could the BdI prevent a two-thirds majority from blocking ELA if it deemed it necessary? Securing eight out of 21 council votes would be required. Even the six votes from Southern European nations, potentially more sympathetic to Italy’s predicament, would be insufficient. To succeed, Italy would need to sway votes from other council members, perhaps by highlighting the systemic risk of an Italian exit triggering a broader Eurozone collapse.

Does this give Italy a stronger hand? Not necessarily.

The ECB Council could permit ELA for Italian banks but, mirroring the Greek crisis, impose capital controls as a condition. This would severely restrict the outflow of deposits from Italy. Further measures, like limiting cash withdrawals and reintroducing border controls, could be implemented to prevent capital flight, as seen in Greece.

While theoretically, the Euro might withstand a bank run, a large-scale deposit exodus from a major economy like Italy could effectively dismantle the monetary union. If the free flow of capital – deposits and cash – is obstructed within the Eurozone, the Euro ceases to function as a truly single currency. This scenario presents significant challenges for the Euro’s future and underscores the importance of understanding these dynamics for CFAs and financial professionals navigating European markets.

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